The trident controlling the group of 13 was Ursula Brennan. General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defense Staff. and Bernard Gray, chief of defense materiel. They made sure that only they and their 10 select subordinates could see the briefing they prepared for the National Security Council. In theory, a Defense Minister other than Philip Hammond was also allowed to see the evidence – Sir Peter Luff, the defense procurement minister – but I have since interviewed him and he says no one told him anything. This secrecy was fortunate for Richards, Gray and Brennan, as the evidence they produced to support the £2 billion catapult leaks was far from reliable. First, the Mandarins inflated the cost of US catapult equipment by more than £300 million, despite written US cost guarantees. It was also argued that buying this US equipment would mean paying significant sales tax – but that was UK VAT! Not only would the UK VAT cost the Treasury nothing, it didn’t have to be paid anyway: under the VAT Act, a simple international agreement, which the US would have happily signed up to, would remove the liability. In addition to these fictitious “costs”, the bid by shipbuilders to customize one of their “customizable” ships suddenly jumped 60% over the 2010 figure. Even all this was not enough to reach £2bn, however: the total then was £1.766bn. At this point the 13 mandarins decided they needed to add a significant percentage for inflation that might occur before the catapult deals were signed, with inkling they simultaneously insisted was imminent. Mandarins were set at 13.25% inflation. This, in 2012. This meant that the new estimated cost of adapting an adaptable carrier came to – oh my – exactly £2bn. Not £1.999 billion, not £2.001 billion: exactly £2.000 billion. The exact number had already been leaked by “defence members” many months before the 13 mandarins even began work on this estimate, in fact.
A remarkable coincidence
The 13 tangerines did not stop there. With an inexplicable stroke of a pen they significantly reduced the cost difference between the F-35B and C versions. Setting these extremely low costs against the over-inflated, fictitious bill of £2 billion, it was only possible to argue that the cancellation of the program was catapulted it would save money. An inconvenient report by the Treasury’s research office just then, marked SECRET – UK EYES ONLY, was simply ignored. The report said that a much larger number of jumpjets would be required to achieve the same combat power as a given number of F-35C catapult planes. I’ve since been able to take a look at that report, and it also says that the lifetime cost of a fleet of F-35C catapults would be more than £2.4 billion cheaper than the F-35B jumpjet – more than eliminating even the comic £2 billion estimate for catapults. Richards, Brennan and Gray forgot to include any of the findings of this report in their briefing to the prime minister. Even all that creative accounting couldn’t make a catapultless aircraft with jumpjets look cheaper than a catapult carrier with F-18 Hornets, so the 13 mandarins seemingly scuttled the existence of the F-18 (and the French Rafale) . These planes were not even mentioned in the briefing to the prime minister and the National Security Council. When the 13 Mandarins were later asked why these items were not included, they categorically replied that they had “ruled out these alternative jets because they would require catapults and hijacking equipment”. Open and close. Richards, Gray, Brennan and the rest of the 13 mandarins weren’t really trying to save money, except perhaps in the very short term. They were trying to kill the catapult carrier project: and in that they succeeded – at least, so far. In May 2012, the decision to cancel the catapult was announced. As a result, last year the Queen Elizabeth, several escort ships and 3,700 sailors, airmen and marines went into danger almost unarmed. Lord Richards, Sir Bernard Gray and Dame Ursula Brennan did not respond to requests for comment.
